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How Institutions Affect Outcomes
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Allowance Systems
Christopher M. Anderson
The objective of this paper is to illustrate that economic institutions matter, i.e., that different rules
of trade present different incentives for bidding, asking, and trading in new markets, and that these
different incentives lead to different price discovery patterns, which yield materially different
outcomes. In a laboratory tradable fishing allowance system, when trade takes place through a double
auction, which parallels an institution common in extant tradable allowance systems, markets are
characterized by high volatility, and equilibrium does not obtain. However, when only leases, and
not permanent trades, are permitted in the early periods, volatility is significantly reduced and
equilibrium obtains. This dependence of equilibration and outcomes on institutions implies policy-
oriented economists must consider institutions in designing new market-based management systems.
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Policy makers are making increasing use of tradable
allowance systems to address environmental and
natural resource management problems, including
water use, pollution, and over-fishing (Tietenberg,
2002). A management authority that applies a trad-
able allowance system typically sets an allowable
level of activity, allocates the allowance among
users, and gives users the right to trade their allo-
cations to others.
1 In doing so, the management
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1 In fisheries, the term “allowance” is used to refer to the privilege to
access a resource at a certain level. This term encompasses both transfer-
able production allocations (ITQs and IFQs) and transferable effort
allocations (e.g., days-at-sea or trap certificates). In the United States,
these allocations are not true property rights, in the sense that they may
be revoked by the government without compensation. Hence, I avoid use
of the term “right.”
authority effectively establishes a market for an
entirely new asset, which can be of great value, and
represents a significant portion of the wealth of the
resource users, particularly in water and fishing ap-
plications where the users are often small or family
businesses. However, because the asset is new,
there is little basis on which the market participants
can draw to determine the prices that are likely to
emerge.
Participants in this new market know only their
private values, and have little idea of the market-
wide marginal value of allowance, which the
competitive model predicts will emerge as the
equilibrium price. As a result, each participant must
rely on the information she can glean from the
market—the bids, asks, and trades of others, as well
as the market reaction to her own bids and asks—to
determine whether or not a prospective trade con-
stitutes a good deal. It is not surprising, then, that
different institutions, which provide different
amounts and different types of information, and
possess different incentives for revealing informa-
tion through bids and asks, yield systematically
different sequences of bids, asks, and contracts, and
therefore equilibrate differently.
The objective of this study is to illustrate that eco-
nomic institutions matter, i.e., to show these different
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patterns of equilibration yield materially different
outcomes. Specifically, in a laboratory evaluation
of a significant tradable fishing allowance system,
one commonly used institution performs poorly
while a simple modification leads to reliable equili-
bration. While the research being discussed is
ongoing, there is sufficient evidence to argue that
policy makers and economists must consider the
equilibration process, and the institutions affecting
it, in developing new market-based management
systems. The wrong institution can lead to so much
volatility during initial trading that effective price
discovery cannot occur, and equilibrium is never
reached. Alternatively, bad outcomes can arise
during price discovery, and although the market
eventually stabilizes, perhaps even at competitive
equilibrium prices, trades made during equilibration
lead to gross inequities among similar participants
based solely on when they traded.
The implication of outcomes’ dependence on
institutions is that policy-oriented economists must
begin asking a question which has previously not
been posed: How should the rules of trade be
designed to best achieve policy objectives? This
question is new because there is nothing in
competitive microeconomic theory which suggests
equilibrium outcomes depend on institutions; there
is no mention of institutions in popular graduate
microeconomic theory texts such as Varian (1992);
Silberberg (1994); or Mas-Colell, Whinston, and
Green (1995). As a result, there is a common per-
ception among economists, politicians, and the
public that if regulators establish property rights for
natural resource use or environmental harms and
allow trade, markets will emerge and efficient
allocations or least-cost abatements will arise (e.g.,
Gwartney et al., 2002). Unfortunately, it is not so
simple.
Economists have not devoted attention to the
equilibration process, or to the institutions on which
it depends, because most of the markets historically
of interest are already well established, or can be
based on established markets, so the initial price
discovery process has already occurred. Conse-
quently, there is not, and has been little need for, a
theory of equilibration.
2 However, markets for
tradable natural resource or environmental damage
allowances are created, and the associated price
discovery process can have important effects on
outcomes for the market participants. Therefore,
effectively implementing market-based manage-
ment measures requires considering the effect of
institutions on price discovery, and on the market
outcomes that are determined during equilibration.
In this paper, the role of institutions in determin-
ing outcomes is illustrated with a series of experi-
ments designed to assess tradable fishing allowance
management. The study is motivated by a 2001
industry proposal to implement a tradable trap cer-
tificate system in the Rhode Island inshore lobster
fishery. This is one of many U.S. fisheries consider-
ing adoption of tradable allowance management,
following recommendations of national panels con-
vened to study fishery management issues (National
Research Council, 1999; Pew Oceans Commission,
2003; U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, 2004),
and the expiration in the fall of 2003 of a six-year
moratorium on new tradable allowance systems.
The plan was recently approved by the Atlantic
States Marine Fisheries Commission, which
manages American lobster in the northeastern
United States. However, the details of the trading
arrangements, which inspired this research, have
not yet been determined.
The following section of the paper discusses why
the price discovery and equilibration process of the
tradable allowance market is important to the func-
tioning of the regulated industry. Next, previous
cases are described in which experiments have
contributed to designing markets for controlling
environmental harm, managing natural resource use,
and other high-value policy applications. The exper-
imental evidence for the dependence of outcomes
on institutions in tradable fishing allowance mar-
kets is then presented. It is shown that when trade
takes place through a double auction market, which
shares many features with the institution most
commonly used to trade fishing allowances in extant
programs, prices are volatile, based on speculation
rather than fundamental values, and do not
converge to equilibrium. However, by prohibiting
permanent allowance trades in the first few years of
the program, a market for temporary lease trades
can establish a price signal which carries over to the
permanent allowance market, facilitating equilibra-
tion. Although this process is not yet sufficiently
well understood to ensure initial lease markets will
work in the field, the final section offers a discus-
sion of the broad policy implications of institutions’
important role in determining outcomes.
2  Walras’ (1954) tatonnement concept presents a way to think about
price discovery and convergence, but without disequilibrium trades
during the price discovery process, it cannot be sensitive to variations in
information structure among non-tatonnement institutions. See Anderson
et al. (2004) for a discussion of the relationship between tatonnement
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The Policy Significance of Price 
Discovery and Equilibrium
The equilibration process of allowance markets
carries policy importance because many of the
commonly cited advantages of allowing markets to
determine effort allocation or production rely on
being in equilibrium, whereas many of the out-
comes feared by managers and resource users are
the result of disequilibrium. When prices are based
on fundamental values, as they are in equilibrium,
price changes are predictable based on changes in
market fundamentals. In fisheries, this means prices
change based on beliefs about changes in the fish-
ery, including new technology, stock fluctuations,
and product market demand. In equilibrium, prices
are indicators of future profitability, and therefore
serve as signals for capital investment. In addition,
the value of held allowances values incumbents’
access to the fishery, and provides security for
retirement. From a normative standpoint, when
trades are based on private fundamental values,
allowances will trade from those who can earn less
profit by fishing them to those who can earn more,
maximizing the profitability of the fishery.
However, when the allowance market is not in
equilibrium, outcomes that are feared by resource
users and managers arise. When prices are not
based on fundamental values, they can fluctuate
unpredictably. Even for those who do not parti-
cipate in speculative trading, and who trade only
when it is in their private interest to do so, there are
reasons to fear volatility. The inability to predict
future prices complicates long-term business and
capitalization decisions. This includes the decision
of whether to participate at all, since arbitrary
fluctuations can significantly affect the value of a
participant’s wealth or retirement savings. Vola-
tility can also shift regulated industries away from
family businesses, as the risk associated with
investment in volatile allowances also provides an
opportunity for consolidation because diversified
large operators may take on allowance market risk
that smaller operators are unwilling to accept. In
farming towns and fishing villages, such consoli-
dation can threaten a local culture and way of life.
In dynamic resource use applications, equilibrium
prices aggregate and convey information about
stock health (Arnason, 1990; Batstone and Sharp,
2003), but inferences drawn from disequilibrium
prices may be incorrect, leading to improper
capitalization levels and incorrect management
decisions.
While there have been relatively few studies of
individual contract price time series from tradable
fishing allowance markets, their findings all suggest
there is considerable market volatility in the first
four to six years of a new tradable allowance pro-
gram. Newell, Sanchirico, and Kerr (2003) identify
price dispersion as a prominent feature of the first
four years of the New Zealand 30-species quota
management system. During this period, dispersion
levels were close to 30% of the average price level;
the level of dispersion over the last five years is
closer to 10%.
3 In the Florida spiny lobster fishery,
Larkin and Milon (2000) report price ranges span-
ning from one to four times the average price in
each of the first five years of the tradable trap cer-
tificate program.
4 During these periods, anecdotal
evidence suggests people grew unhappy with the
system: they learned they sold their allowance at far
below its long-term value, or purchased far above
it; they saw others reap windfall profits from
buying an allowance far below its long-term value,
or selling far above it; or they made investment
decisions based on incorrect price signals.
Stories of the effects of volatility in these and
other programs often enter policy debates surround-
ing the possible adoption of tradable allowance
management. However, for fisheries, or communi-
ties within community-based management systems
(McCay, 2004, this journal issue), to select the best
management alternative for their fishery, they must
understand the potential of all alternatives. This
requires comparing the likely outcome under a well-
designed tradable allowance system to those under
other management systems. If equilibration can be
accelerated, or the associated volatility reduced, by
changing the institution through which trade occurs,
then policy makers and managed stakeholder groups
could have a better idea of the potential of tradable
allowance systems on which to base their deci-
sions.
5 Even if they do not select tradable allowances,
3  Newell, Sanchirico, and Kerr (2003) measure dispersion as the ratio
of the absolute value of the difference between a trade’s price and the
month’s mean price, and the month’s mean price.
4  Even in small fisheries, where everyone knows how much effort
everyone else is applying to earn what money, price discovery is neces-
sary because knowing everyone’s average value of an effort or production
unit at current production levels is little help in determining the fishery-
wide marginal profitability—which determines the allowance price—at
the often much lower production levels frequently imposed with new
tradable allowance systems (McCay, 2004, this journal issue).
5  Of course, non-market-based management systems can also be better-
and worse-designed, and the comparison should also consider the best-
designed version of those alternative systems. The contribution here is
that decision makers and stakeholders need to be sensitive to the idea that
there are better- and less-well-designed markets.196   October 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
they can make their choice with a better idea of the
strengths and weaknesses of a well-designed system.
The Use of Experimental Methods in 
Policy Analysis
Since equilibration plays an important role in deter-
mining whether the promises or the fears associated
with tradable allowance systems are realized,
selecting an institution that rapidly and reliably
equilibrates is an important factor in achieving a
successful policy outcome. Without a theory of
how the incentives of different institutions affect
the information revealed through bids, asks, and
trades, which ultimately guides price discovery, a
different tool is needed to understand how alterna-
tive institutions affect outcomes.
In economic experiments, human subjects play
the role of market participants in a controlled
setting designed to reflect the key incentives in the
naturally occurring environment being studied. In
a fishery management experiment, for example,
subjects are given a profit schedule from which
their earnings are determined based on their chosen
fishing effort and other variables of interest. The
profit schedule and available actions are selected to
reflect the fishery and management measures being
studied. Participants who better respond to these
induced preferences are paid more, in cash, at the
end of the experiment for their participation (Smith,
1976, 1994; Davis and Holt, 1993). It is axiomatic
in economics that people make decisions which
maximize their utility, and since money earned in
the laboratory can be used to increase utility outside
the lab, participants will make decisions during the
experiment that earn them the most money. There-
fore, if the incentives of the economic environment
being simulated have been properly represented in
the experiment, then participants acting to maxi-
mize their laboratory earnings will make the same
decisions as agents trying to maximize their utilities
in the natural environment.
6
Economic experiments can contribute to the anal-
ysis of market-based policies in two ways. First,
experiments can provide carefully controlled tests
of the theoretical models underlying regulatory sys-
tems. Many of the reasons cited for using tradable
allowances rely on the ability of the market to
accurately price the allowances. When the market
price is based on supply and demand derived from
the marginal profit an additional allowance unit
provides fishers, the post-trading allocation of
allowances maximizes the profitability of the fish-
ery. Further, allowance costs can be covered with
earnings from the additional allowances, and price
changes will be predictable based on expected
changes in the stock, harvesting costs, and market
demand. However, realizing these efficient alloca-
tions requires equilibration. An empirical question
that can be addressed in the laboratory is whether
allowance markets equilibrate, or instead exhibit
unstable or nonequilibrium tendencies due to fea-
tures of the underlying derived demand functions,
the asset-like properties of permanent allowance, or
particular rules of trade that facilitate speculation or
other disequilibrium behavior.
A second way experimental techniques can
contribute to analyzing market-based policies is by
comparing different ways of structuring the market
(Plott, 1994, 1997). Different definitions of the
property right, rules for trading it, and complemen-
tary institutions affect the speed and nature of con-
vergence, and thus ultimately determine the outcome.
When theory offers little guidance, experiments can
be used to testbed trading institutions or evaluate
the merits of alternative trading policy proposals to
identify those that appear best suited for a particular
application (Banks et al., 2003). Flaws in proposed
designs can be uncovered and corrected before
implementation in the field, where such adjustments
may be impossible or require much greater expense.
Experimental testbedding has been successful in
a number of high-profile, high-value policy appli-
cations, including the auction used by NASA to
determine space shuttle payload priorities (Ledyard,
Porter, and Wessen, 2000) and the auction the FCC
has employed to raise more than $9 billion selling
licenses to bandwidth used by cellular telephones
(Banks et al., 2003; Salant, 2000; Plott, 1997).
Cellular licenses are challenging to auction
efficiently because there are complementarities in
owning adjacent licenses: owning both south and
central Florida is more valuable than the sum of
owning just south and just central because fees do
not need to be paid to the owner of the other to
carry calls across zones. In a sequential auction,
bidders on south Florida would need to adjust their
price strategically, not knowing whether they would
be able to afford central Florida, auctioned later.
Experiments helped design an auction institution
that improves efficiency and maximizes revenue
by allowing participants to bid on all licenses
6  See Anderson and Sutinen (forthcoming); Smith (1976, 1994); Plott
(1994); Davis and Holt (1993), among others, for more detailed discus-
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simultaneously, so the synergies of owning adjacent
licenses can be priced in the auction. Experiments
also addressed practical questions about the effici-
ency impacts of minimum bid increments, which
considerably speed this complex auction.
Most closely related to tradable fishing allow-
ances are a number of applications in water rights
trading (e.g., Murphy et al., 2000; Murphy et al.,
2003; Cummings, Holt, and Laury, 2004), and trad-
able pollution rights (Franciosi et al., 1993) (see
Shogren and Hurley, 1999, for a survey). Specific
cases include the market mechanism for trading sul-
fur dioxide and nitrous oxide in southern California
(Ishikida et al., 2000; Carlson et al., 1993) and the
mechanism used by the Environmental Protection
Agency to trade pollution permits for sulfur dioxide
under the Clean Air Act (Cason, 1995; Cason and
Plott, 1996). In the latter case, the EPA imple-
mented a discriminative auction for trading permits
in which buyers and sellers each submit sealed bids,
and low-asking sellers were matched with high-
bidding buyers; buyers paid their bid price to their
matched sellers. Experiments demonstrated that this
institution’s incentives led sellers to underreport the
true costs of emissions control in hopes of being
matched with lower-bidding buyers, resulting in
inefficient trades. These experimental results sub-
sequently led to a change in the auction design for
pollution permits. This is an example of how
investing in laboratory testbed research before
implementing a rights-trading system can improve
the outcomes of tradable allowance markets.
Experiments on Tradable Fishing 
Allowance Markets
To address the question of whether equilibrium,
and the policy outcomes associated with it, obtains
in tradable fishing allowance markets, a series of
experiments was run using alternative trading rules.
One series of experiments was run using rules
which parallel those commonly used in field tradable
allowance markets: trade of the permanent allowance
began at the onset of the program, and took place
through a double auction, in which both buyers and
sellers can advertise a trading price on a central
market board, or accept a trading price advertised
by someone else. As in many field markets, double
auction trading is bilateral, can take place at any
time, and different trades can occur at different
prices. For comparison, a second set of experiments
was run in which only temporary leases, and not
permanent allowance trades, were permitted at the
beginning of trading,
7 and exchange took place
through a call market in which all trades occurred
at the same time and price. In the call market,
buyers and sellers could submit schedules of prices
at which they were willing to trade. At an appointed
time the market would close, a central auctioneer
would use the submitted schedules of buy and sell
prices to construct supply and demand curves, and
would execute all trades to the left of the supply/
demand intersection at the intersection price.
8
Figure 1 shows the price observed in five double
auction sessions,
9 and figure 2 shows the prices ob-
served in five call market sessions. In each session,
12 to 14 human subjects, each playing the role of a
fisherman managed by tradable allowances, interact
through a computerized market to exchange allow-
ance units which can be used to earn profit from
fishing. Each of the 12 periods begins with a trading
stage during which the market is open and trades
can be executed. When the market closes, each sub-
ject earns profit from fishing based on the quantity
of allowance units she holds. Subjects read the
amount of profit from fishing they earn for any
number of allowance units from a table on their
computer screen. In this experiment, all subjects
had identical profit functions estimated from 2001
7  The initial lease period treatment was inspired by the gradual intro-
duction of individual vessel quota trading in the British Columbia halibut
fishery (Casey et al., 1995). The quota program began in 1991, and during
the first two years, no quota transfers (temporary or permanent) were
allowed separate from fishing licenses. After two years, temporary
(annual) transfers were permitted, which remained in effect until about
three years ago. Both permanent and temporary transfers are now allowed
in the fishery (Turris, 2004).
8  The difference in institutions is the material difference between the
two experiments, but there were small procedural differences our
debriefing indicates did not affect subjects’ understanding of the problem.
The instructions for the call market with initial lease period (CMILP)
experiment differed from those for the double auction (DA) in that they
were abbreviated, and broken into two sections—the first explaining the
market software and lease market for the first round, and the second
explaining the asset structure administered before the second round.
There were two noteworthy software revisions between the DA and
CMILP experiments. First, the subjects’ software screen had a graph of
the profit function in the DA experiment in addition to the table; the
graph was not used in the CMILP experiment. Second, the CMILP
software had a feature which alerted subjects when they were about to
make a bid or ask that would not increase their joint profits from trading
and fishing. Debriefing suggests this feature reduced some subjects’
confusion more quickly, but did not inhibit subjects for whom trading at
a loss was strategic. Based on others’ asset market experiments in which
similar loss warnings were implemented, and data reported in Anderson
and Sutinen (2004) in which a call market with loss warnings but without
an initial lease period shows high volatility and above equilibrium prices,
I do not believe these changes caused the differences between the figures.
Ideally, the DA experiment could be replicated with these features and
with instructions which more closely mirrored those used in the CMILP
experiment. However, appropriate scientific skepticism aside, it is
instructive to look at the data from these experiments side-by-side and
learn from the differences between them.
9  Due to a software glitch, period 3 of round 1 of session C was zero
seconds long.198   October 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Figure 1. Period average prices in the double auction (DA)
Figure 2. Period average prices in the call market with an initial lease
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logbook data on medium-large lobster operations in
Area 2, which encompasses the Rhode Island in-
shore fishing grounds. At the end of the experiment,
subjects are paid, in cash, their total earnings from
fishing and net trading profits.
In both figures 1 and 2, the 12 periods are grouped
into three rounds of four periods each. In all three
rounds in figure 1, and in rounds 2 and 3 in figure
2, there is a downward-sloping dashed line that
indicates the upper bound of the competitive equi-
librium price prediction, 11.5 experimental dollars
times the number of periods remaining in the
round.
10 (In round 1 of figure 2, the predicted price
line is a constant 11.5 dollars because only single-
year transfers are allowed.) Allowances are assets,
which in the experiment are given a life of four
periods. In the first period of each round, subjects
are given an endowment of allowance units and
cash. Trades are permanent, in that endowments are
not restored until the beginning of the next round.
Therefore, an allowance unit purchased in the first
period of a round allows the purchaser to earn
profit fishing it in all four periods, while an allow-
ance unit purchased in the fourth period provides
profit in only one period. If allowance units are
traded based on fundamental values, the additional
profit that can be earned by fishing them, the equi-
librium model predicts prices will decline as periods
elapse because there are fewer periods remaining in
which to earn profit from fishing with purchased
allowance units. Between rounds, endowments are
restored to initial levels, and the four-period exercise
is repeated to assess the effect of experience.
The major result of this paper is that although the
market fundamentals and equilibrium predictions
are the same in these two experiments, the out-
comes are consistently and systematically different.
Consider the average price observations in figure
1’s double auction (DA) with those in the similarly
structured rounds 2 and 3 of figure 2’s call market
with an initial lease period (CMILP). The most
important difference is that every single price
observation after the first period of a round is
considerably above the equilibrium prediction in
the DA, whereas the equilibrium model describes
well the average behavior of prices in the CMILP,
where observations are closer to and distributed
both above and below the equilibrium prediction.
Although the data in both figures begin each round
with some spread around the equilibrium price, there
is a consistent difference in how prices change in
consecutive periods. In the DA, prices often change
little, or even increase, in the second and third per-
iods to result in higher than equilibrium prices, as
equilibrium predicts prices should fall. In contrast,
the price changes between the first and second
periods in the CMILP move in the direction of
equilibrium, and changes between the second and
third periods decrease at about the same rate as
equilibrium predicts. Based on this initial examin-
ation, trade prices in the DA do not appear to reflect
the fundamental value of allowance and do not
appear to equilibrate. In contrast, the prices in the
CMILP do appear to be responding to changes in
fundamental value, consistent with the competitive
equilibrium model.
11 This difference can only be
attributed to the different market structures used to
facilitate exchange.
The effective difference between these sets of
trading rules is that in the DA in figure 1, allowing
trades to take place at different prices when little
information was available led to a great deal of
volatility, which in turn reinforced beliefs about the
prices others would be willing to pay in the future.
This fueled speculation that led subjects to bid up
the price based on beliefs about what others would
pay in future periods, rather than to trade based on
the marginal profit from fishing provided by allow-
ances. In contrast, the CMILP in figure 2 both
provided a high-quality initial price signal from the
lease market and eliminated contrary price signals
arising from contracts occurring at different prices.
The net effect is that when the asset market is intro-
duced in round 2 of the CMILP experiment, subjects
have information on which to evaluate prospective
trades, which allows the market to stabilize quickly.
To establish the statistical significance of the ap-
parent differences in average price patterns, results
are pooled across sessions and across rounds using
an autoregressive heteroskedastic panel regression.
Table 1 presents a model which tests separately for
each experiment the prediction of equilibrium
theory that prices should equal the single-period 10  With discrete-unit supply and demand curves, we must select be-
tween a price tunnel (an interval of equilibrium prices) and a quantity tun-
nel (an interval of equilibrium quantities). In experiments with quantity
tunnels, trading commissions are often offered to provide incentive to
make the inframarginal trade at the equilibrium price. In environments
where resale is allowed, commissions cannot be offered, so a price tunnel
was used, where the market provides the incentive to trade the infra-
marginal unit. In these experiments, the competitive equilibrium model
predicts the price will be between 10.25 and 11.5 experimental dollars
times the number of periods remaining in the round.
11  Anderson and Sutinen (forthcoming) statistically reject the hypoth-
esis that the average prices and between-period price changes in the DA
are consistent with equilibrium, and Anderson and Sutinen (2004) statisti-
cally establish that the price levels and changes in the CMILP are con-
sistent with the equilibrium model. See those papers for an analysis of the
respective experiment data, and a detailed discussion of the procedures
that generated them.200   October 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 1. Heteroskedastic Panel Model of Aver-
age Prices in the CMILP and DA Experiments
(N = 99)
Variable   Coefficient
Base Model:
  Constant 2.110
(2.951)
  Periods Left in Round 11.332***
(0.923)
  Last Period in Round !0.629
(2.091)
DA Differences:
  DA×Constant 36.636***
(4.158)
  DA×Periods Left in Round !9.737***
(1.296)
  DA×Last Period in Round !10.806***
(2.947)
Wald Statistic [degrees of freedom] 475.20 [5]       
Notes: Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% level.
Values in parentheses are standard errors.
profit the inframarginal unit provides its demander
times the number of periods remaining in the round
for the demander to use it. The upper portion of the
table shows estimated coefficients for a Constant,
the number of Periods Left in Round, and Last Per-
iod in Round, an indicator variable for the fourth
period, which may behave differently because there
is no future on which to base possible speculation;
the bottom section shows these variables interacted
with an indicator for the DA experiment in figure 1.
The estimated coefficients in the upper section of
table 1, representing the determinants of price in the
CMILP experiment, exactly match those predicted
by theory: the Constant and Last Period in Round
indicator variables are not significantly different
from zero, and the coefficient on Periods Left in
Round is squarely within the predicted interval of
10.25 to 11.5 experimental dollars. Based on these
findings, the competitive equilibrium pricing model
cannot be rejected when trade takes place through
a call market and there is an initial leasing period.
The lower section of table 1, representing differ-
ences in the determinants of price between the
CMILP and DA, reveals a significantly different
price pattern for the DA experiment. The effect of
the number of DA×Periods Left in Round is a
statistically and economically significant 9.74
experimental dollars lower than in the CMILP,
leaving an average price decrease of only 1.59
dollars per period. Instead, prices are explained
primarily by the highly significant DA×Constant,
reflecting that prices do not change as the equilib-
rium model predicts during the first three periods.
The significantly negative coefficient on the
DA×Last Period in Round indicates that prices
crash at the end of each round, dropping more in
the final period than in the previous periods in the
round. Therefore, the competitive equilibrium
pricing model is rejected when the laboratory trad-
able allowance market uses a double auction, an
institution which mirrors many of the features of
field allowance trading institutions.
The difference in equilibration between the two
institutions leads to a significant difference in the
efficiency of the allocation of allowance, and there-
fore in the total profit earned from the fishery.
Figures 3 and 4 show the efficiencies observed in
each session, relative to the efficiency level at the
endowment.
12 In figure 3, there is little tendency for
efficiency to improve through trading. In only two
of the observed rounds, session B/round 1 and
session E/round 3, are observed efficiencies higher
than the initial endowment in every period. From an
efficiency standpoint, prohibiting trading would
have been better than allowing trade through a
double auction.
Figure 4 presents a much different efficiency ef-
fect of trading. While there is some price discovery,
in four of the five sessions, efficiency improves in
all periods of the asset market (rounds 2 and 3); in
session B, it improves in six of the eight periods.
Treating rounds within the same session as
independent, table 2 reports the average efficiency
observed at the end of each period in rounds 2 and
3 of the two experiments. The bottom row of the
table presents the p-value of a Wilcoxon signed-
rank test of the null hypothesis that the distribution
of efficiencies is the same in the two experiments.
This null hypothesis is rejected in each period, as
efficiency is significantly higher in the CMILP ex-
periment. Thus, the institution through which trade
occurs not only affects the prices that arise, but also
the surplus extracted from the fishery through trad-
ing. This results in a difference in the distribution
of experiment earnings: payoffs to subjects in the
DA experiment earned an average of $23.82 with
a standard deviation of $3.95, and those in the
CMILP earned more on average, $24.59, and with
less variation, a standard deviation of $1.21.
12  The endowment is 94% efficient, a value based on the proposed pol-
icy in the Rhode Island lobster fishery. An academic experiment testing
a model would normally set a much lower initial efficiency, but the group
of managers and lobstermen assisting with the project suggested the more
realistic value would ease communicating results to the policy audience.Anderson Institutions for Tradable Fishing Allowances   201
Figure 3. Efficiency of allowance allocations in the double auction (DA)
  Figure 4. Efficiency of allowance allocations in the call market with an
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Table 2. Differences in Average Efficiency in
Each Period (rounds 2 and 3)
PERIOD
Experiment 1 2 3 4
Double Auction (DA) 93.6% 92.6% 91.7% 89.2%
Call Market w/Initial
Lease Period (CMILP) 97.3% 98.1% 97.8% 98.2%
Wilcoxon p-Value 0.0494 0.0025 0.0012 0.0003
The pattern of higher-than-equilibrium prices
which do not fall with changes in the fundamental
value, but then crash at the end of the round—seen
in the DA experiment—is consistent with bubble-
and-crash cycles seen in other experimental asset
markets (Smith, Suchanek, and Williams, 1988;
Fisher and Kelly, 2000; Noussair, Robin, and
Ruffieux, 2001; Lei, Noussair, and Plott, 2001; see
Sunder, 1995, for a survey). This is a symptom of
some underlying difficulty with price discovery
presented by the double auction institution, which
is addressed by the call market with an initial lease
period. There are at least two differences in the
information available to participants in the two ex-
periments’ allowance asset markets. First, CMILP
subjects had learned the market-wide value of the
marginal allowance unit, the price that emerged in
the lease market of the first round. Second, because
all trades took place at the same price at the end of
the trading period in the CMILP, subjects did not
receive noisy signals from trade prices which fluc-
tuated wildly during the trading period.
An additional experiment is necessary to deter-
mine which of these differences in the institutions’
information structures improved price discovery.
Figure 5 shows the average prices from three experi-
mental sessions in which allowances are exchanged
through a double auction, but in which the asset
market is preceded by an initial lease period
(DAILP). To prevent subject pool contamination,
profit functions were changed from those used in
the earlier experiments. In the DAILP, the equilib-
rium price is between 12.6 and 13.8 experimental
dollars per period remaining in the round, but profit
functions—and the corresponding elasticities of
allowance supply and demand—are similar to those
of the DA and CMILP, and the equilibrium volume
is the same 49 units. Both the lease round and the
asset market rounds appear to be consistent with the
equilibrium predictions. In rounds 2 and 3, there is
some dispersion of prices across sessions, but ses-
sions beginning near the equilibrium price remain
there, those beginning farther from equilibrium
grow closer, and prices decrease at about the rate
predicted by the equilibrium model.
13 Findings of
this experiment suggest it is the initial lease period,
rather than the call market, which is expediting price
discovery in the market for permanent allowance in
the CMILP experiment.
A comparison of the price discovery process in
a double auction market for tradable fishing allow-
ance with and without an initial lease period can be
made by examining figures 6 and 7. The figures
show the time series of individual trade prices from
one session in the double auction without and with
an initial lease period, respectively. The heavy
vertical lines indicate points where the endowment
was reset, and the thinner lines indicate changes of
period when endowments were not reset. Within
each figure, the width of the area between the
vertical lines is proportional to the number of trades
occurring during that period. The thin horizontal
lines indicate the upper bound of the predicted
equilibrium price tunnel.
In comparing the graphs, two differences stand
out. First, in the asset market following the initial
lease period (round 2 in figure 7), there are far fewer
trades than occur in the double auction in figure 6.
Second, the range and fluctuation in prices are far
smaller following the initial lease period. Together,
these features suggest that information gathered in
the initial lease period leads to a less volatile market.
One measure of volatility is price dispersion,
defined as the ratio of the average of the absolute
value of the difference between a trade price and
the mean trade price in a period, and the mean trade
price in that period (Newell, Sanchirico, and Kerr,
2003). Table 3 presents the average price dispersions
observed in each round, along with the p-value of
a Wilcoxon signed-rank test that the distribution of
single-period dispersion measures within each round
is the same between experiments.
14 The p-values
indicate the DAILP has significantly lower disper-
sion than the DA in every round, and in rounds 2
and 3 jointly. In both experiments, the highest
dispersions are in the first round, reflecting that
price discovery must take place, and necessarily
13  Anderson and Sutinen (2004) affirm this result statistically.
14  This discussion (and for table 4 following) compares round 2 of the
DAILP, the first asset round of that experiment, with round 2 of the DA,
the second asset round of that experiment. This comparison is chosen
because it gives the DA its best chance at equaling the performance of the
DAILP, and in doing so addresses the argument that experience in an
asset market (or with the market software) could achieve a comparable
reduction in volatility as an initial lease period. The statistical results are
stronger when round 1 of the DA is compared with round 2 of the DAILP.Anderson Institutions for Tradable Fishing Allowances   203
involves some fluctuations. It is noteworthy that a
substantial portion of this dispersion persists
without an initial lease period. Moving from round
1 to round 2, not only does the DAILP (now an
asset market) still have lower dispersion than the
double auction alone, but also the difference be-
tween the two experiments increases. This suggests
that, if reducing volatility and facilitating price
discovery are prerequisites for meeting policy objec-
tives, the initial periods of the market are better
spent with a lease market than with permanent
allowance trading. In fact, after three rounds of
experience with a double auction asset market,
volatility is still higher than in either the initial lease
period or the first asset market round following the
initial lease period; there is so much dispersion in
the double auction market that it is having difficulty
converging.
A second sign of volatility is trading volume.
Higher than equilibrium volumes suggest inefficient
disequilibrium trades are taking place, and later need
to be corrected; persistent higher than equilibrium
trading volumes suggest trading may occur for
reasons other than mutual gains from trade based
on the profit that could be earned from fishing, such
as speculation. Table 4 shows the number of trades
observed in each period, averaged over sessions and
rounds 2 and 3 for each experiment. The bottom
row presents p-values from a Wilcoxon signed-rank
test that the distribution of observed trading volumes
is the same in each period of the two experiments.
Although the two experiments do not differ signif-
icantly on the number of trades in the first period
(the average for the double auction experiment is
heavily influenced by one very high volume round,
which does not so heavily influence the nonpara-
metric test), there is a significant difference in all
subsequent periods. While the average number of
trades in the first period of both experiments is very
close to 49, the minimum number necessary to
achieve equilibrium, trading continues at that vol-
ume in all subsequent periods in the DA treatment,
when equilibrium predicts no trades will occur.
There is significantly less persistent trading fol-
lowing an initial lease period, though still a nonzero
amount. This trading could result from subjects
continuing to refine their holdings to maximize
profit following disequilibrium trades, speculation
(e.g., Smith, Suchanek, and Williams, 1988), or
boredom (Lei, Noussair, and Plott, 2001). In the
DAILP, efficiencies stabilize or increase after the
first period of each round, suggesting that these
trades are at least welfare neutral. However, effi-
ciency can be seen falling in figure 4, implying the
Figure 5. Period average prices in a double auction with initial lease 
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Figure 6. Time series of contract prices in a double auction (DA) session
Figure 7. Time series of contract prices in a double auction with initial lease
period (DAILP) sessionAnderson Institutions for Tradable Fishing Allowances   205
Table 3. Average Per Period Price Dispersion in
Each Round
ROUND
Experiment 1 2 3 2&3
Double Auction (DA) 0.245 0.209 0.217 0.213
Double Auction w/Initial
Lease Period (DAILP)      0.160
 a 0.081 0.086 0.083
Wilcoxon p-Value  NA  0.0001  0.0001 < 10
–8
a Round 1 of the DAILP is the initial lease period, not an asset market.
Table 4. Average Trading Volume in Asset Mar-
ket Rounds 2 and 3
PERIOD
Experiment 1 2 3 4
Double Auction (DA) 63.4 56.8 50.8 55.3
Double Auction w/Initial
Lease Period (DAILP)       44.7 18.5 17.5 15.7
Wilcoxon p-Value 0.1927 0.0048 0.0034  0.0011
persistent trading activity in the double auction is
not mutually beneficial, and is motivated by reasons
other than market fundamentals. When trades are
not based on fundamentals, price discovery is very
difficult.
Discussion
Tradable rights systems have gained popularity in
recent years for managing a variety of natural
resource problems. With the expiration in fall 2003
of a six-year moratorium on new tradable fishing
allowance programs in the United States, stake-
holders and managers unsatisfied with the outcomes
of other management systems are considering this
newly available option. However, stakeholders and
managers wish to avoid some of the aspects of the
outcomes of previous experiences with tradable
allowance management, which could have resulted
from high levels of market volatility. As suggested
by these experiments, while some volatility during
price discovery is inevitable, persistent, large price
swings are associated with the particular rules that
are most frequently used to facilitate trade. In the
laboratory, a higher-quality price signal derived
from a single-period lease market, which equili-
brates reliably, significantly reduces volatility and
facilitates price discovery, leading to efficient, stable
equilibrium outcomes.
The general lesson to be taken from this research
is that the rules of trade matter: Efficient market out-
comes are not an automatic result of establishing a
property right and permitting its trade. For policy
makers, this implies that attention must be paid to
the rules of trade, as well as to traditional factors
such as the definition of the allowance, who is eli-
gible to receive it, and the quantity to be allocated.
For resource users and policy makers assessing
whether or not a tradable allowance system is appro-
priate for their fishery, the effect of institutions on
outcomes also means that what can be inferred from
previous experiences depends on features specific to
the fishery and to the institution that was used.
Because the presented experiments suggest features
of commonly used trading rules may not effectively
facilitate convergence, the potential of tradable
allowance management may differ significantly
from past experiences.
A common reaction of policy makers and stake-
holders to adverse experiences with tradable allow-
ance programs is to implement new programs with
substantially similar institutions, but with restrictions
on trade designed to address previously identified
problems. Examples include restrictions on resale
to discourage speculation, or on the maximum
amount of allowance any participant can hold to
limit consolidation. However, these experiments
suggest bad outcomes may be symptoms of a
deeper problem with the chosen rules of trade. The
best way to prevent volatility, consolidation, and
other feared outcomes may be to identify an institu-
tion which works well, rather than imposing limita-
tions on trade within one which does not.
One argument economists frequently put forward
when faced with the result that institutions matter is
that some unspecified amount of experience will
improve market performance measures and lead to
equilibration. In our application, this argument has
two shortcomings. First, past experience with trad-
able allowance programs has shown that the transi-
tion from command-and-control management and
the price discovery process are very important in
determining winners and losers, and satisfaction
with the system. In fact, Newell, Sanchirico, and
Kerr (2003), and Larkin and Milon (2000) both
document reduced volatility four to six years into
the New Zealand and Florida spiny lobster
allowance systems, respectively. However, during
the initial years of volatility, some participants were
hurt or upset by what turned out to be, in retrospect,
poor business decisions made in response to price
signals which did not accurately represent market
fundamentals.206   October 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
The second counterpoint, which is specific to the
asset market nature of the experiments and disequi-
librium behavior observed here, is that the rejection
of the equilibrium hypothesis in the double auction
experiment is not based merely on prices’ statistical
distance from equilibrium predictions. Rather, there
is systematic movement away from the equilibrium,
similar in structure to the bubbles observed in other
experimental asset markets (e.g., Smith, Suchanek,
and Williams, 1988), most of which have much
longer asset lives. From these, we know additional
periods lead only to longer-lived bubbles, which
crash shortly before the asset expires; asset markets
do not learn their way out of bubbles.
That institutions play a significant role in deter-
mining policy outcomes poses a problem for econo-
mists, who now must add another dimension to their
analyses. Institutions are particularly challenging
because there is no received theory, no model, with
which to understand what institutions will be well
suited to a particular application. This is why experi-
mental economics is an important tool. In addition
to testing hypotheses about economic theories, it
can be used to evaluate institutions in a controlled
setting (and with knowledge of important market
variables such as individual profit functions, which
are difficult to know in the field), and to compare
alternative institutions to determine those that best
achieve policy goals. Despite being a relatively new
tool, an increasing literature of successful applica-
tions to the design of real institutions suggests
experimentation can inform and improve field
implementations of market-based policies; experi-
ments may be the best available science for
assessing features of market-based institutions, and
perhaps others as well.
Although the role played by the rules of trade in
determining outcomes imposes the additional burden
of verifying that market-based management achieves
its intended goals, it also provides a powerful new
degree of freedom for achieving policy objectives.
Through careful design, testing, and selection of
trading rules, institutions can be chosen that not
only equilibrate effectively, but also achieve sec-
ondary policy objectives less obviously related to
market outcomes. Here, too, experiments can play
an important role, as they can be designed to test
for, or compare among institutions, other regulari-
ties of market outcomes.
However, like any science, foundational know-
ledge must be built slowly and carefully before it
can be reliably applied. Because so little is known
about how and why different institutions yield the
consistently different outcomes they do, care must
be taken in each application to ensure the reason for
any regularity in the laboratory transfers to the
field. Even in the absence of a formal theory, it is
necessary to test a story about the interplay of infor-
mation and incentives to expect external validity.
Although it is tempting to conclude from the data
presented here that initial lease periods would
enhance equilibration in new tradable allowance
markets, it is important to understand exactly why
they work prior to field implementation.
Future work can focus on what exactly market
participants learn in the initial lease period. Do they
learn only that the per period price is $11.50? Do
they actually learn about the relationship between
assets and fundamental values as represented by
their profit functions? Or is it something different
altogether? Such a focus carries policy importance
because it allows prediction of the sorts of market
variations to which initial lease market results
might be robust. For example, if participants learn
only that the price is a particular value, what they
have learned is completely devalued by any market
shock. On the other extreme, if subjects have learned
how to value assets, the stability induced by the
initial lease period may persist through any shock.
More likely, subjects have learned something more
than the price, but less than the rules of asset valua-
tion, such as the quantity of allowances to demand.
This information could be robust to some shocks,
such as changes in stock health and market demand,
but not others, such as changes in technology that
shift the equilibrium distribution of allowances.
Although it has not been widely acknowledged
by economists, the rules of trade play a significant
role in determining market outcomes. This is partic-
ularly true when a market is created for an entirely
new commodity or asset, and traders have little
market information on which to evaluate prospec-
tive contracts. Tradable allowance systems are an
increasingly popular tool for managing environ-
mental and natural resources, but they establish new
assets about which little value information exists.
This creates a policy need for designing trading
institutions that equilibrate quickly, and with a min-
imum of volatility, which can produce irreversible
extreme outcomes. Lacking a theory on which to
base such development, the laboratory serves as a
convenient and flexible environment in which to
evaluate alternative institutions in a controlled
way—comparing them on the basis of efficiency,
volatility, equilibration speed, and other application-
specific criteria. By identifying the institution thatAnderson Institutions for Tradable Fishing Allowances   207
best achieves the bio- and socioeconomic goals of
each application, the full potential of tradable allow-
ance management can be realized. Only then can trad-
able allowances be compared to other management
alternatives, and the best management system for
each community, fishery, and resource be selected.
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